1. Andrew Burrows (e.d.) Principles of the English Law of Obligations UOP 2015
There are a number of situations in which one person is liable for the acts of another but in which the reason is that the person liable is himself contemplated as being in breach of duty. The claimant's cause of action is then the defendant's own wrong, and the defendant is personally, not vicariously liable. Vicarious liability as understood in English law is liability imposed upon a person even though he has committed no wrong and simply because of his relationship to the person who has committed the wrong. Vicarious liability therefore involves the attribution of the liability of the wrongdoer to the defendant, not attribution of the wrongdoer's act. Provided the relationship of defendant satisfies the requirements of vicarious liability, it does not matter if the wrong is a common law tort, equitable wrongs and breaches of statutory obligations as they are to common law torts.
Vicarious liability is a form of strict liability imposed without any suggestion that the person in question has been guilty of any breach of duty. The exposure to this kind of liability inheres in the position occupied by the person made liable and the relation with that position bears to that of the actual wrongdoer. The case of greatest importance is that of the employer. The employer is liable for the torts of his employee committed in the course of the employee's employment.
The vicariously liable employer is a joint tortfeasor with the employee. The victim can sue either or both, and in principle the employers vicarious liability is secondary so that having paid the damages, the person liable, and by subrogation his insurer, has a right of recourse against the primary wrongdoer, much as shooting has a right to reimbursement from the principal debtor. In practice this right of recourse is little used; it lives in a limbo created by the likelihood that, if it were, it would be abolished by Act of Parliament.
2. Judgment of the court (Fifth Chamber) in Case C- 484/18 par. 28-30
It should be noted that, according to the court's settled case law, in the procedure laid down by article 267 TFEU (Συνθήκη για τη Λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης – ΣΛΕΕ), the functions of the code of justice court of justice and those of the referring quotes are clearly distinct, and it falls exclusively to the latter to interpret national legislation. Thus, it is not for the court, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, to rule on the interpretation of national provisions. Τhe court must take account, under the division of jurisdiction between the court of the European Union and the national courts, of the factual and legislative context, as described in the order for reference, in which the questions put to it are set.
it is also appropriate to recall the Court's settled case law according to which when national courts apply domestic law, they are bound to interpret it, so far as possible, and in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and consequently comply with the third paragraph of article 288 TFEU. Τhis obligation to interpret national law in conformity with the European Union law is inherent in the system of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, since it enables national courts, for matters within the jurisdiction, to ensure that their European Union law is fully effective when they determine the disputes between them.
Να μεταφραστούν τα ανωτέρω κείμενα στην ελληνική γλώσσα.
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